The installer of the rootkit writes the content of malicious kernel driver (244 736 bytes) to the last sectors of the disk (offset: 2 142 830 592) and then modifies sectors 0 (MBR), 60, 61 and 62.īelow, the 'Process Monitor' log shows sectors modified by the rootkit installer: to hide itself, rootkit needs to control only a few sectors of the disk.rootkit does not need any registry entry because it is loaded by MBR code.rootkit does not need a file - code could exists in some sectors of the disk and it cannot be deleted as a usual file.full control of machine boot process-code is executed before the OS starts.However, the first sectors of disk are still unprotected ! Rootkit in the wildĪt the end of 2007 stealth MBR rootkit was discovered by MR Team members (thanks to Tammy & MJ) and it looks like this way of affecting NT systems could be more common in near future if MBR stays unprotected. Nevertheless, MS blocked write-access to disk sectors from userland code on VISTA after the pagefile attack, Unfortunately, all the Windows NT family (including VISTA) still have the same security flaw - MBR can be modified from usermode. The eEye Digital Security researchers skipped one part - BootRoot didn't hide the real content of affected sectors like old DOS Stealth MBR viruses,īut it had only been created to show the possible way to compromise Windows NT OS. The technique used in their project wasn't new and had been popular in DOS times, but they first successfully used it in Windows NT Environment. In 2005 Derek Soeder and Ryan Permeh, researchers from eEye Digital Security, presented

Avast rootkit mbr physicaldrive0